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THE MISSOURI PERPETUITIES ACT*
William F. Fratcher*
In 1816 Missouri Territory received the law in force in England prior
to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, which commenced on
24 March 1605, Old Style, and 3 April 1606, New Style.1 England then
had a rule, laid down by an unreported 1576 case 2 which has been re-
ferred to since 1890 as the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell,2 that a remainder
could not be limited to the unborn child of an unborn remainderman for
life. Like those of most other states, the Missouri courts have ignored the
Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, perhaps on the theory that a decision is not
part of the common law unless published in the official reports. Although
no hint of the modem common law Rule Against Perpetuities was pub-
lished in the official reports until Lord Nottingham's 1682 opinion in
The Duke of Norfolk's Case,4 the Missouri courts have treated the Rule
*This article has been adapted from the author's contribution to a panel dis-
cussion on current developments in perpetuities law conducted by the Section
on Property during the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools at Phoenix, Arizona, on January 5, 1980.
The Missouri Perpetuities Act, RSMo § 442.555 (1978) provides:
1. When any limitation or provision violates the rule against perpetuities or
a rule or policy corollary thereto and the instrument containing the limitation
or provision also contains other limitations or provisions which do not in
themselves violate the rule against perpetuities or any such rule or policy,
the other limitations or provisions shall be valid and effective in accordance
with their terms unless the limitation or provision which violates the rule
against perpetuities or such rule or policy is manifestly so essential to the dis-
positive scheme of the grantor, settlor or testator that it is inferable that he
would not wish the limitations or provisions which do not in themselves
violate the rule against perpetuities to stand alone. Doubts as to the probable
wishes of the grantor, settlor or testator shall be resolved in favor of the
validity of limitations and provisions.
2. When any limitation or provision violates the rule against perpetuities or
a rule or policy corollary thereto and reformation would more closely approxi-
mate the primary purpose or scheme of the grantor, settlor or testator than
total invalidity of the limitation or provision, upon the timely filing of a
petition in a court of competent jurisdiction, by any party in interest, all par-
ties in interest having been served by process, the limitation or provision shall
be reformed, if possible, to the extent necessary to avoid violation of the rule or
policy and, as so reformed, shall be valid and effective.
3. This section shall not apply to any limitation or provision as to which
the period of the rule against perpetuities has begun to run prior to the
first day of November in the year in which this section becomes effective.
*OR. B. Price Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia;
A.B., 1933; A.M., 1938, Wayne State; J.D., 1936; LL.M., 1951; S.J.D., 1952, Michi-
gan. Author, PERPErturriEs AND OTHER RESTRAINTS (1955) and of the 1961 and
later pocket parts to L. Simr~s &c A. SMrTH, THE LAW oF FuTuRE INTERxsS (2d ed.
1956).
1. 1 Mo. Terr. Laws 436 (current version at RSMo § 1.010 (1978)).
2. Haddon's Case (1576), cited in Perrot's Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 634, 637 (1584).
3. 44 CL D. 85 (1890).
4. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682), affd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (House of Lords 1685).
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as in force in the state. This may be on the theory advanced by Judge
Woodward in his 1818 opinion in the case of Grant v. The Earl of Sel-
kirk' that the common law "became complete and insusceptible of any
additions" upon the first coronation of Richard the Lion-Hearted, which
occurred on 'Sunday, 3 September 1189, Old Style. From this it follows
that the modern common law Rule Against Perpetuities, although not an-
nounced until 1682 or completed until 1833,1 was already in existence, in
its most fully developed form, in gremio legis, on Thursday the 24th of
March 1605, Old Style.
A future interest of someone other than the grantor or testator which
is to follow immediately an estate or interest measured by a human life
created by the same deed or will is a remainder.7 An indestructible re-
mainder which may possibly vest in interest after the expiration of the
perpetuity period is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Thus a
bequest to "my daughter Mary Bull for life, remainder to her children
who reach the age of twenty-three" is void as to the remainder.8 An inde-
structible future interest of someone other than the grantor or testator
which is not a remainder is void under the Rule if it may become posses-
sory after the expiration of the perpetuity period. Thus an option to pur-
chase without time limit is invalid.9 So is a lease to commence "when the
convention hall which the lessor plans to build is completed."'10 And if land
is conveyed to "John Stiles and his heirs but if liquor is sold on the prem-
ises the fee simple shall pass to Roger White and his heirs," the shifting
executory interest of Roger White is void under the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities."1 An indestructible trust for a purpose (e.g., care of graves or
pet animals) or a non-charitable society is void if it may possibly last longer
than the perpetuity period.12
Like most other American courts, those of Missouri have not ap-
plied the Rule Against Perpetuities to such reversionary interests as
5. 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1814-1824, 431, 436.
6. Cadell v. Palmer, 131 Eng. Rep. 859 (House of Lords 1833), was the de-
cision which finally established the perpetuity period. The period begins on the
effective date of the deed or will which creates the interest in question unless some
person has power to destroy the interest for his own benefit, in which case the
period begins when his power expires. The perpetuity period is human lives in
being when the period begins, plus 21 years, plus any period of human gestation
involved in the disposition. L. Sims & A. SinmH, THE LAw or FuTupR INTERESTS
§§ 1223-1227 (2d ed. 1956).
7. L. Siamrs & A. Smn'H, supra note 6, §§ 102, 103.
8. Bull v. Pritchard, 38 Eng. Rep. 83 (1826); L. SiEms & A. SmrTH, supra
note 6, § 1237.
9. London 8& South Western Ry. v. Gomm., 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882); L. SiMxs
& A. S ITH, supra note 6, § 1244.
10. Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958);
L. SImxs & A. SmITH, supra note 6, § 1242.
11. Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray)
142 (1855); L. SImEs & A. SmITH, supra note 6, § 1236.
12. Rickard v. Robson, 54 Eng. Rep. 1132 (1862); Carne v. Long, 45 Eng.
Rep. 550 (1860); L. Snrms & A. Smrm, supra note 6, §§ 1394-1395.
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possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition subse-
quent (known to devotees of the Restatement of Property as powers of
termination).' 3 The Missouri courts have applied the Rule to executory
interests,' 4 indestructible contingent remainders,' 5 options to purchase
land,' 6 and honorary trusts.' 7 The acceptance of the Rule so far as it relates
to honorary trusts presumably includes the principle of antediluvian ca-
ninity. This principle, based on knowledge that the average life of a dog is
from 16 to 18 years,' 8 or a quarter of that of humans, reckons the possible
life of a dog at a quarter of the longest reported human life span, that of
Methuselah, who lived 969 years, as reported in Genesis 5:27 (Authorized
Version 1611). A quarter of 969 is 242-. It follows that a trust to support my
12-year old dog Fido so long as he lives is wholly void because, according
to the mysterious and unchallengeable wisdom of the courts, Fido may
live another 230 years and three months.' 9
Before discussing the pre-1965 perpetuities decisions which influenced
the Missouri Perpetuities Act of 1965, the creation of future interests in
Missouri and their effect require mention. At common law a conveyance to
John Stiles for life, remainder to his heirs, did not create a future interest;
John Stiles took a present estate in fee simple.2 0 Under an 1845 Missouri
statute2 ' John Stiles takes only an estate for life, followed by a remainder
13. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918) (right of entry);
Shipton v. Sheridan, 531 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975) (possibility of re-
verter); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 372 (1944); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 155
(1936); L. SIMEs " A. Ssrr;, supra note 6, §§ 128-12'9. Possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent are subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities in England. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 16 Geo. 5, c. 20,§ 4 (3); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 12. Fratcher, Differences
Between the English and American Rules Against Perpetuities, 28 CONVEYANCERPROP. LAw. 244 (1964). Twelve American states (Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, RhodeIsland, and South Dakota) have enacted legislation providing that possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent expire,, under some
conditons, in a stipulated number of years, usually 30, after their creation. L. Smss19 A. S 'm, supra note 6, § 1994 and 1979 Supp. For an argument in favor of
adopting legislation of this type in Missouri, see Fratcher, Exorcise the Curse f
Reversionary Possibilities, 28 J. Mo. BAR 34 (1972).
14. Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Shipton v. Sheri-dan, 531 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
15. Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
16. Tucker v. Ratley, 568 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).17. See Clark v. Crandall, 319 Mo. 87, 5 S.W.2d 383 (1928).
18. 16 ENCYCLOPAEut A BDao ra)e cA 976 (llth ed. 1911) ("Longevity"). But
see 10 ENcYcL~OPAEDA BRIrMANNCA 913 (15th ed. 1974) ("Life-Span").
19. In re McNeill's Estate, 230 Cal. App. 2d 449, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1964)two dogs and one cat); In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 95 N.E.2d 779
1950) (one dog); In ie Kelly, Cleary v. Dillon, [1932 1 I.R. 255 (four dogs);
L. S&s~s & A. SiirnT, supra note 6, § 1223. But see In re Dean, Cooper-Dean v.
Stevens, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889). The courts do not define the principle in the same
terms as this writer does but the effect is the same.
20. Shelley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (1581).
21. RSMo § 7, at 217 (1845) (current version at RSMo § 442.490 (1978));
Mo. Rev. Laws 1825, at 794, § 18 (current version at RSMo § 474.470 (1978)) (abol-
ished the Rule in Shelley's Case as to devises).
[Vol. 45
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in the persons who turn out to be his heirs at his death. The contingent
remainder is indestructible during John's lifetime.2 2 Under the English
law in force from 1285 a conveyance to John Stiles and the heirs of his
body did not create a future interest; John Stiles took a present estate in
fee tail.2 3 Under a Missouri statute which originated in 1816,24 John
Stiles takes only an estate for life, followed by a remainder in fee simple
absolute in the persons who turn out to be the heirs of his body at the
time of his death. Illinois, with the same type of statute, holds that the
remainder vests in John's children as born; 25 in Missouri the remainder
is contingent and cannot be destroyed until John's death.2 6 Moreover, a
shifting executory interest which would cut off the fee simple of the
heirs of the body is absolutely void for repugnancy even though it does
not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. 27 As you may have guessed by
now, all other types of contingent remainder are indestructible in Mis-
souri.2 8
When a legal future interest has been created, the person in posses-
sion is usually either a tenant for life or a tenant in fee simple subject to
a shifting executory interest. In either case, it is important to the tenant
and to the public weal that the tenant be able to make and finance im-
provements needed to make the land useful and productive under current
conditions or to effect its sale to a purchaser who will be able to make and
22. Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66 (1940); Green v. Irvin, 309
Mo. 302, 274 S.W. 684 (1925). This means that no one can convey a merchantable
title to the land while John Stiles is alive.
23. Statute de Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285).
24. 1 Mo. Terr. Laws at 436, § 2 (1816) (current version at RSMo § 442.470
(1978)). See Ely, Can an Estate Tail be Docked During Life of First Taker?, 45
U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3 (1931); Fratcher, The Missouri Entail Statute Should be
Revised, 27 J. Mo. BAR 69 (1971); Hudson, Estates Tail in Missouri, 7 ILL. L. Rv.
355 (1913), reprinted in 1 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5 (1913); Steiner, Estates Tail in
Missouri, 7 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 93 (1939).
25. Moore v. Reddel, 259 Ill. 36, 102 N.E. 257 (1913); Voris v. Sloan, 68 Ill.
588 (1873). But see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 99, Comment b and Illustra-
tions (1936). If the life tenant is over 60 and the remainder is vested in his
children, a purchaser may be willing to accept a conveyance from the life tenant
and his children because the risk of more children being born is small.
26. Moore v. Moore, 329 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. 1959), cited in Fratcher, Trusts
and Succession in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 417, 438 (1960); Schee v. Boone, 295
Mo. 212, 243 S.W. 882 (1922); Emmerson v. Hughes, 110 Mo. 627, 19 S.W. 979
(1892). No one can convey merchantable title while John Stiles is alive. John's
children will take the remainder only if they survive their father, hence a con-
veyance from them will be worthless if they predecease John and grandchildren
are the heirs of his body.
27. Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo. 212, 243 S.V. 882 (1922). This does not, how-
ever, prevent the limitation of an alternative contingent remainder. A devise to
John Stiles and the heirs of his body but if John dies without issue him sur-
viving to Roger White and his heirs would give Roger a valid contingent re-
mainder which would become a possessory estate in fee simple if John dies with-
out issue him surviving. Tapley v. Dill, 358 Mo. 824, 217 S.W.2d 369 (1949).
28. Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66 (1940); Eckhardt, The De-
structibility of Contingent Remainders in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 268 (1941).
This means that no one can convey merchantable title while the life tenant is alive.
19801
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finance such improvements. The devastating results of a life tenant's in-
ability to adjust to the annexation of rural land into a growing city will
be familiar to some readers from Dean Gulliver's discussion in his future
interests casebook of the New York case of Moore v. Littel.29
The Statute of Gloucester of 127830 provided that a tenant for life or
years who committed waste should pay triple damages and forfeit his
estate. It could be enforced only by a reversioner or remainderman in fee
and then only when there was no intervening freehold estate in a living
person. 3 ' Missouri adopted the Statute in 181632 and amended it in 185533
to allow a remainderman for life or years to sue and to permit a reversioner
or remainderman in fee to do so even though there was an intervening
freehold estate in a living person. The English courts held that it was waste
to convert cultivated land to pasture or pasture to cultivated land 34 and
that the erection of improvements was waste even though the tenant
bore their cost and they increased the value of the reversion or remainder.
For example, in City of London v. Greyme,3 5 decided in 1607, it was held
29. 41 N.Y. 66 (1869), discussed in A. GULLvER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESrs 301-23 (1959). John Jackson was tenant for life of a
farm, with remainder to his heirs. When he was in his 60s the City of Brooklyn
annexed the farm, constructed a grid of streets across it, and increased the taxes
greatly. John's cows could not reach water and his plow could not be moved
where it was needed because of the streets. His income dropped so low that he
could neither pay for the fencing required to keep animals within the new city
blocks nor pay the higher taxes. At the age of 76 John gave up and conveyed
his life estate to his 11 children. The children could not convey merchantable
title to lots because they might not be his heirs. In consequence, by the time of
John's death at the age of 89, his family, which should have been wealthy, was
ruined. The farm was worthless to everyone for 30 years.
30. 6 Edw. I, c. 5, § 2 (1278). "And he which shall be attainted of Waste,
shall lose the Thing that he hath wasted, and moreover shall recompense thrice
so much as the Waste shall be taxed at." The remainder was not recognized until
1305. Fitz William v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33 Edw. I 20 (1305). The contingent
remainder to unborn or unascertained persons was not recognized until shortly
before 1500. 3 W. HoLDSwoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 134-36 (5th ed. 1942);
7 W. HoLnswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 82-101 (2d ed. 1937). It follows
that the draftsmen of the Statute of Gloucester were not thinking of estates
for life followed by remainders but only of those followed by reversions. A
reversioner is a landlord with whom a tenant is connected by a tenurial relation-
ship and with whom he usually has frequent dealings. There is no disagreement
with the draftsmen of the statute that a tenant under a five-year lease who is
paying rent monthly to his landlord ought not to build a pig sty or paint the
barn purple without asking the landlord's permission. When a life estate is fol-
lowed by a remainder held by a stranger with whom the life tenant has had no
dealings or by unborn or unascertained contingent remaindermen, there is no
tenurial relationship or history of prior contacts. The situation is very different
from that contemplated by the draftsmen of the statute. How can a life tenant
possibly secure permission from the unborn heirs of his body to install plumbing,
electric wiring, or central heating?
31. COKE ON LrrrLETON f. 53b (1628).
32. See note 1 supra.
33. Mo. Laws 1855, at 1018, §§ 42-51 (current version at RSMo § 537.430
(1978)).
34. CoKE ON LITrLETON ff. 53a, 53b (1628).
35. 79 Eng. Rep. 158 (K.B. 1607). The tenant could not operate the mill by
[Vol. 45
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that a tenant who improved a hand-operated mill so that it could be
operated by a horse was subject to the penalties of the Statute. The Mis-
souri decisions are in full accord. In a 1924 case 36 it was held that the
erection, at the tenant's expense, of an outdoor privy was waste. In 1975
it was decided that a tenant's installation of wiring, air conditioning, and
central heating, which cost him $50,000, was waste which would forfeit
his estate if not expressly permitted by the terms of the instrument creat-
ing it. 3 7 The Missouri courts hold, of course, that it is waste for a life
tenant to cut timber38 or open mines.39
Stephens v. Gillette,4 o decided in 1971, involved an unimproved, un-
fenced forty acre tract of land near a main highway leading from St. Louis.
It had been devised in 1926 to the plaintiff with a gift over, in the event
of her death without bodily heirs, to another descendant of the testator.
The plaintiff, who was a sixty-year-old crippled spinster earning her liv-
ing as a typist, sued the heirs of the executory devisee to secure sale of the
fee simple and investment of the proceeds under a statute permitting
such sale "when the life or other estate of immediate enjoyment is burden-
some and unprofitable."4' It was shown that the land produced no income
hand because of his landlord's breach of a promise to provide eight men for the
purpose. His use of a horse was a necessity under the circumstances. See also Cole
v. Green, 83 Eng. Rep. 422, aff'd, 85 Eng. Rep. 1022 (House of Lords 1671) (re-
modeling building so as to increase its rental value by some 66%); Lord Darcy v.
Askwith, 80 Eng. Rep. 380 (C.P. 1618).
36. Ritchie v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 219 Mo. App. 90, 266 S.W. 492 (K.C.
1924), 297 S.W. 435 (K.C. Mo. App. 1927).
37. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc. v. Building Leasing Corp., 527 S.W.2d
407 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975).
38. Van Hoozer v. Van Hoozer, 18 Mo. App. 19 (K.C. 1885).
39. Miller v. Bowen Coal & Mining Co., 40 S.W.2d 485 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
40. 464 S.W.2d 507 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
41. H.B. 693, 53d GA, Mo. Laws 1925, at 139, provided:
[Alny person or persons holding the estate or an interest in the estate,
carrying the right of immediate use and enjoyment of such lands, may
sue in equity for sale of such lands or any of the same upon the ground
that the life or other estate of immediate enjoyment is burdensome and
unprofitable for that the cost of paying the taxes and assessments thereon
and holding, maintaining, caring for and preserving the lands from waste,
or injury, and deterioration, exceeds the reasonable value of the rents and
profits thereof, and that a greater income can probably be had from pro-
ceeds of a sale thereof invested in bonds of the United States or of Mis-
souri or some municipality or school district thereof or first lien mortgage
loans upon land situate in this state ....
Recognizing that the italicized word "for" was almost certainly a typographical
error, the Revisor of Statutes changed it to "or" in § 528.010 of the official Mis-
souri Revised Statutes of 1969 and 1978. The court, however, cited V.A.M.S. vol. 36,
which was printed in 1953 and used the word "for." This may explain its decision
that, however burdensome and unprofitable the life estate might be, it would not
order sale of the fee simple if the land would produce enough income to pay taxes
and maintenance costs. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 96.02 restates § 528.010, but uses the word
"because" instead of "for" or "or." This would seem to favor the narrow basis of
relief indicated by the court of appeals. The reference to the statute in Keim v.
Mattes, 507 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Mo. 1974), does not clarify the matter.
1980]
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at all, the taxes were $83.68 a year, that it could be sold for $32,000, and
that this would give the plaintiff some $1,900 a year income. Relief was
denied on the ground that it should be possible to rent the small part of
the tract which had been cleared for agricultural purposes at a rental
great enough to pay the taxes.
It is, thus, evident that a tenant in possession is unable to meet
changed conditions which require improvements to the land if there is
an outstanding remainder or executory interest in persons who are un-
born, unascertained, or uncooperative. It is sometimes stated that the
situation is much better when the future interests are created as beneficial
interests under a trust. In the absence of statute it is a breach of trust
for a trustee to make improvements or even to rebuild a building destroyed
by fire unless the terms of the trust authorize such action. 42 In Cozart v.
Green Trails Management Corp.,43 decided in 1973, a Missouri court held
that it was a breach of trust for a trustee expressly authorized to construct
paths and stables to build a road. The court said, "[T]he powers of the
trustee are limited by the terms of the trust. These powers are strictly
construed."44
The Missouri decisions hold that a trustee may not give a lease which
will extend beyond the term of the trust.45 It would seem that an implied
power to sell land is never found46 and the court indicated in an 1895
case 47 that it could not under any circumstances authorize an act not
permitted by the terms of the trust. This view may have been relaxed48
42. J. PERRY, A TRFATjsE ON THE LAw or TRusIS AND TRUSTEES §§ 526, 553,
606 (5th ed. 1899).
43. 501 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
44. Id. at 187.
45. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Van Raalte, 214 Mo. App. 172, 259 S.W.
1067 (St. L. 1924). Cf. Carter v. Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629, 92 S.W.2d
647 (1936) (court found an implied power to lease for 50 years). The will directed
the trustees to keep a commercial building insured against fire so that they could
rebuild. The building burned and the insurance proceeds were insufficient to
erect a suitable building. The tenant under the 50-year lease covenanted to erect
a building that was appropriate.
46. Garesche v. Levering Invest. Co., 146 Mo. 436, 445, 48 S.W. 653, 657
(1898). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TRUSTS § 190 (1959) (implied power to sell
land would be found if necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of
the trust). An implied power to sell corporate stock was found in First Nat'l Bank
v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1962).
47. Drake v. Crane, 127 Mo. 85, 29 S.W. 990 (1895). But see RESTATETENT
(SECOND) TRUSTS § 167 (1959). Section 190, Comment f, provides:
Although by the terms of the trust the trustee is not empowered to sell
trust property, or even if he is directed not to sell it, yet if owing to cir-
cumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him the pur-
pose of the trust would be defeated or substantially impaired unless the
property is sold, a sale can be made with the permission of the court.
48. Seigle v. First Nat'l Co., 338 Mo. 417, 90 S.W.2d 776 (1936) (trustee
authorized to defer carrying out a mandatory direction to sell securities in
view of bad market condition during the depression). But see Thomson v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956) (court will not permit trustee to sell
securities merely because income from them has dropped from six to three per-
cent and is insufficient to support life beneficiary).
[Vol. 45
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but I have not found a judicial authorization to sell land. An express
power of sale does not include a power to mortgage"
In a case decided in 1914,50 land was devised to A for the use of B
upon trust to pay the income to C for life and, after her death, to convey
to C's children, whenever born. It was held that, despite the fact that the
whole trust was a use on a use, the Statute of Uses executed the remainder
of the children of C into a legal remainder in view of the Missouri rule
that an expressly imposed duty to convey to the beneficiaries is not an
active duty.51 Hence a conveyance by the trustee, purportedly made under
an express power of sale conferred by the will, conveyed only an estate
for the life of C. From this case it would seem that a trustee can seldom
convey or mortgage the fee simple because the future beneficial interests
under the trust are usually executed by the Statute of Uses and powers ex-
pressly conferred upon him tend to be construed to be limited to the
estate pur autre vie which he holds by virtue of the Statute of Uses. In
Missouri, the effort to create future interests as beneficial interests under
trusts may be insufficient to ensure that the land can be improved, mort-
gaged, or sold as circumstances require. In sum, the creation of any kind
of a future interest, legal or equitable, usually acts as a virtually complete
restraint on improvement and alienation.
The Missouri law of future interests and trusts, as described in the
preceding five paragraphs, is archaic, obsolete, and contrary to the inter-
ests of both property owners and the public. There is no good reason why
subjecting land to a future interest or a trust should act as a prohibition
on improvement, development, change in use to meet new circumstances,
leasing, mortgage, or sale. In England the Statute of Gloucester and the
Statute of Uses have been repealed. 52 Every tenant for life and trustee of
land has statutory power to make improvements, to mortgage the fee
simple to finance them, to give long leases, and to sell the full fee simple
49. Price v. Courtney, 87 Mo. 387 (1885).
50. De Lashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 412, 169 S.W. 34 (1914).
51. Cornwell v. Orton, 126 Mo. 355, 27 S.W. 536 (1894) (trust for sole and
separate use of a married woman under the terms of which the trustee was ex-
pressly required to convey, mortgage, and lease as directed by the beneficiary inter
vivos or by will). This decision represents an extreme minority view. Rarick, The
Trustee's Estate and the Ultimate Interest, 8 OKIA. L. REv. 1, 35 (1955).
52. Chapter 5 of the Statute of Gloucester, supra note 30, which was deemed
to provide that a tenant for life who improved or changed the mode of use of
the land should forfeit his estate, was repealed by the Civil Procedure Acts Re-
peal Act, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 59 (1879). The Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535),
which was designed to increase the feudal revenues of King Henry VIII, was
deemed to provide that the interest of a beneficiary of a trust of land was
"executed" into a legal estate if the trustee had no active duties with respect to
that beneficiary. See Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 Mo. L. Rxv. 39 (1969). This statute,
which serves no purpose but causes much trouble, was repealed in England by the
Law of Property Amendment Act, 1924, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 5, § 1. It is, however,
still in force in Missouri. RSMo § 456.020 (1978).
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absolute.53 The proceeds of sale are held on trust for the life tenant or
beneficiary and the remaindermen. Progressive states in this country have
conferred like statutory powers on trustees54 and enabled legal life tenants
to secure judicial sale of the fee simple and investment of the proceeds,
upon trust for the life tenant and remaindermen, whenever this is desirable
under the circumstances. 55 The unsatisfactory state of the Missouri law
of future interests and trusts may explain, in part, the peculiar approach of
the Missouri courts to the problem of the effect of violation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
The landmark perpetuities case in Missouri is Lockridge v. Mace,56
decided in 1892. It involved a devise of a farm to the testator's children for
life, remainder to his grandchildren for life, remainder to his great-
grandchildren in fee. The remainder to the great-grandchildren was held
to violate the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, in consequence of
which not only it but the prior life estates of the children and grandchil-
dren were void. The court indicated that whenever any part of a disposi-
tion of particular property violates the Rule, all of that disposition is
ipso facto void. This doctrine of automatic infectious invalidity was ex-
tended by the court in 1907 to a rule that the whole will is void if any
provision in it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and all of its pro-
visions are part of a general plan.5 7 This is consistent with the Missouri
approach in other areas. In a 1930 case involving a pecuniary bequest to
a stranger and a devise of the residue to a family trust, it was indicated
that the family trust would fail if the wholly unrelated pecuniary bequest
was procured by undue influence.18 A 1931 case involved a twenty-year
lease under which the lessee was to pay ten cents per ton for any coal
mined and $50 per month for maintaining a railroad switch on the land.
There was no coal but the lessee constructed and used the switch. It was
held that the lessor could not recover the $50 a month rent because, he
53. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. 5, c. 18, §§ 38, 39, 41, 51, 71, 83,
89, 106, 108, 109. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 &: 16 GEo. 5, c. 19, §§ 10, 16, 19; Law of
Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, §9 1, 28. See Fratcher, Fiduciary Adminis-
tration in England, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 12, 26-29 (1965); Maudsley, Escaping the
Tyranny of Common Law Estates, 42 Mo. L. REv. 355 (1977).
54. The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act (1964) or similar legislation has
been enacted in some 20 states. 7A U.L.A. 761 (1978). The need for such legislation
is explained in Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627
(1962).
55. This has been achieved in some states by legislation and in others by
judicial decision. The statutes and cases are collected in Fratcher, A Modest Pro-
posal For Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 Durm L.J. 517,
537-42; L. Sitms & A. SmrrH, supra note 6, §§ 1941-1946.
56. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1892).
57. Shepperd v. Fisher, 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907); Eckhardt, Rule
tlgainst Perpetuities in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 27, 61 (1965); Hudson, The
Rule Against Perpetuities in Missouri, 3 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 24 (1914); Kroeger,
The Effect of Violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 297.
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being a life tenant, the provision as to coal was illegal and therefore the
whole lease was void.5 9
Under English law the invalidity of a contingent remainder under the
Rule Against Perpetuities does not affect the validity of prior interests
in the same property which have vested or are certain to vest within the
perpetuity period. It has no effect whatever on dispositions of other prop-
erty made by the same will or deed. The invalidity of a shifting executory
interest which follows a fee simple determinable does not affect the fee
simple determinable. The failure of a shifting executory interest limited to
cut off an otherwise absolute fee simple makes the fee simple absolute. In
other words, the will or deed takes effect as if the language purporting to
create the interest which violates the Rule had never been included.60 In
this country, however, some courts have developed a doctrine of infectious
invalidity under which interests that do not themselves violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities may fail because other interests created by the same
will or deed do violate the Rule. Most of the courts which have accepted
this doctrine do not apply it unless it is quite apparent that the grantor
or testator would prefer, if he knew that part of his disposition would
fail, that some other part or parts also should fail. Courts in Illinois,
Missouri, and Pennsylvania, however, took the position represented by
Lockridge v. Mace61 that failure of a future interest destroys all prior in-
terests in the same property.62
Section 402 of the Restatement of Property also declares that invalidity
of a remote future interest under the Rule Against Perpetuities may entail
the infectious invalidity of prior interests in the same property or of the
entire deed or will, including codicils.63 In some cases total invalidity of
the will may be preferable to partial invalidity. Suppose a will devises the
bulk of the estate to a family trust and the residue to a home for elderly
cats. If the family trust fails, the testator might well prefer to have his
estate distributed as on intestacy to having it all pass to the home for
elderly cats.6 4 The Restatement enjoins consideration of the testator's
probable preference in determining whether infectious invalidity should
occur. The Missouri rule of automatic infectious invalidity did not.
The forgetfulness of lawyers who draft wills and deeds results in
violations of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Some forget that there is such
59. Miller v. Bowen Coal & Mining Co., 40 S.W.2d 485 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
60. G. CHESHIRE, THE MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 477 (1925).
61. See note 56 supra.
62. L. SImES & A. SMITH, supra note 6, § 1262.
63. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 402, (b) and (c) (1944); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 2, § 1.5, Comments a, b, 1979).
64. See Fratcher, Bequests for Purposes, 56 IoW.4 L. REv. 773, 779-80 (1971).
Suppose that the bulk of the settlor's property is placed in an inter vivos family
trust and that the settlor, thinking that he has little to pass to will, devises his
entire estate to a home for elderly cats. If the family trust fails under the Rule
Against Perpetuities, should the will also fail under the doctrine of infectious
invalidity? Even the Missouri courts have not gone this far with the doctrine.
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a rule. Some forget that an option to purchase without a time limit is
void under the Rule.0 Some forget that the proposed municipal conven-
tion hall may take twenty-two years to complete. 66 Some forget the prin-
ciple of antediluvian caninity.67 Some forget that old men occasionally
marry young women, who usually survive their husbands. Worst of all,
some lawyers forget that, because Methuselah begat a child at the age of
187,68 and Abraham and Sarah had their first child when he was 100 and
she was 90,60 there is a conclusive presumption that every human being is
capable of having a child as long as she lives.70 Suppose that the client,
speaking in 1980 from a bed in a nursing home, tells the lawyer that she
wants to give Blackacre to Uncle John Stiles, who is 80, for life, then to
his wife, Aunt Lucy Stiles, who is 78, for her life, and then to their chil-
dren, Bob and Molly. By the time the lawyer has returned to his office
he has forgotten all of the names except that of John Stiles, who belongs to
his Rotary Club. Accordingly he drafts a paragraph of the will reading,
"I devise my farm called Blackacre, comprising 640 acres, more or less,
situated on the south bank of the Missouri River, to my uncle, John
Stiles, for and during the full term of his natural life, remainder to his
widow, for and during the full term of her natural life, remainder to his
children who survive both him and his widow." Forgetfulness has made
the remainder void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The lawyer has
forgotten that Aunt Lucy may die next week and that Uncle John may
marry a woman born in 1982 and have ten children by her.
Some thirty years ago thoughtful lawyers began to worry about pos-
sible malpractice liability for lawyer forgetfulness. Some astute lawyers pro-
posed a modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities called the "wait and
see" doctrine. Under this doctrine, the validity of future interests, instead
of being determined at the beginning of the perpetuity period on the basis
of the facts and possibilities then existing, is determined at the end of
the period on the basis of the facts as they then are. The "wait and see"
doctrine has been adopted by statute or judicial decision in some twenty-
one jurisdictions. 7 ' It is a virtually foolproof protection against lawyer
65. See notes 9 & 16 supra.
66. See note 10 supra.
67. See notes 12, 17 & 19 supra.
68. Genesis 5:25.
69. Genesis 17:17, 21:5.
70. Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787), laid down a conclusive pre-
sumption that everyone, regardless of age, sex, or physical condition, is capable
of having a child so long as he lives. This presumption was criticized in the famous
article, Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938).
71. L. SiNixs 9. A. SMrrH, supra note 6, § 1411 (1979 Supp.). In Connecticut,
Florida, Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts, the waiting is only until the termi-
nation of life interests created by the disposition. The waiting is for the full per-
petuity period in England, Hong Kong, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Zealand,
Northern Ireland, the Northwest Territories, Ohio, Ontario, Pennsylvania, Queens-
land, Vermont, Victoria, Wales, Washington, Western Australia, and the Yukon
Territory. Waiting for the full perpetuity period is proposed by RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 2, § 1.4, 1979).
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malpractice liability for forgetfulness. If the devisees must wait a hundred
years before the invalidity of the will can be determined, the forgetful
lawyer who drafted it, not being antediluvian, will be dead and the non-
claim statute will have barred all claims against his estate.
A 1952 article 72 discussed the Missouri perpetuities cases and pro-
posed legislation which was introduced in 1959.73 This bill would "wait and
see" until the expiration of the perpetuity period. If the future interest in
question had vested by then, it was valid; if it had not, it passed to who-
ever was then entitled to the income. In 1961 a bill based on part of the
Vermont statute was introduced in Missouri.7 4 Under this bill there would
be "waiting and seeing" until the end of the perpetuity period, followed
by judicial reformation cy-pres of any future interest which had not vested
by the end of the period. Neither of these bills was approved by the in-
terested committees of the Missouri Bar.
Because my colleague, Professor Willard Eckhardt, was busy writing
a book, I was asked to prepare a bill to be sponsored by the Missouri Bar.
My draft bill of 21 March 1960 contained thirteen sections providing: (1)
That if an instrument is susceptible to two constructions, one of which
avoids violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, that one is to be pre-
ferred.7 5 (2) That infectious invalidity should operate only if the settlor
or testator would have preferred it to validity of those parts of the dis-
position which do not violate the Rule.76 (3) That a class gift should be
good as to those members of the class whose interests could not vest too
remotely, even though the interests of other members of the class could do
so. 7 7 (4) That age contingencies should be reduced to age twenty-one
72. Kroeger, The Effect of Violation of The Rule Against Perpetuities in
Missouri, 1952 WAsm U.L.Q. 297.
73. House Bill 341, 70th GA (1959). This was reintroduced in 1961 as
House Bill 34, 71st GA. Under this bill, Fido, note 19 supra, would be told,
"If you die in less than 21 years, the whole accumulated income will be paid to
your estate; if you live more than 21 years, you get the principal as well as the
income; but, in either event, you get nothing at all before your death or the end
of 21 years, whichever comes first."
74. House Bill 3, 71st GA (1961). The bill was based on VT. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 27, § 501 (1975). The Vermont statute was drafted by Professor W. Barton
Leach. It contained two other sections, one of which gave it purely prospective
effect and the other of which provided, "This act shall not be construed to in-
validate or modify the terms of any interest which would have been valid prior
to its enactment." VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, §§ 502, 503 (1975).
75. This was based on RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 375 (1944). It was
really unnecessary because the Missouri Supreme Court had already adopted the
rule of the Restatement. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932).
76. This is the rule of REsTAT.MENT OF PROPERTY § 402 (1944), note 63 supra.
77. This was designed to abolish the much-criticized rule in Leake v.
Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817), that a class gift is wholly void if the interest
of any possible member might vest too remotely, even though the interests of
some members are already vested or could not vest too remotely, e.g., a remainder
to "my great-grandchildren" when there are already several in being.
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when necessary to avoid violation of the Rule. 8 (5) That the possibility
of a person over fifty having a child in the future should not invalidate
an interest.7 9 (6) That the possibility of a person now in being marrying
a person not yet born should not invalidate an interest. This was to
eliminate the "unborn widow" trap. (7) That a limitation which violates
the Rule should be reformed, if possible, to come within the Rule. if
reformation would more closely approximate the intent of the settlor or
testator than total invalidity. (8) An express rejection of "wait and see."
(9) That possibilities of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition
subsequent on estates in fee simple should expire after thirty years.8 0
(10) That these reversionary interests should be alienable. (11) That a
trust for specific animals or a noncharitable purpose could be carried out
for twenty-one years. This was to take care of Fido. (12) That all bene-
ficiaries of a trust may compel its termination, despite its terms. This was
designed to prevent trusts for noncharitable corporations and societies from
failing under the Rule Against Perpetuities.8 1 (13) That the Act should
be retroactive.8 2
Discussions in Missouri Bar committees and with members of the bar
Board of Governors and the legislature indicated that the bill was too
long to get through and that retroactivity was unacceptable. Willard, Eck-
hardt and I cut it down to three sections: (1) to shift from automatic in-
fectious invalidity to the Restatement view that infectious invalidity should
occur only if the settlor or testator would wish it; (2) to permit judicial
reformation cy-pres if the settlor or testator would wish it; (3) to pro-
vide that the Act would be prospective only except as to revocable inter
vivos trust instruments and wills of settlors and testators who were alive
on the effective date.
Why did we reject "wait and see"? In view of the attitude of Missouri
courts, total elimination of infectious invalidity seemed impossible. "Wait
and see" means that the validity of provisions cannot be determined until
the end of the measuring lives (Massachusetts type statute) or twenty-one
years after the end of these lives (Pennsylvania type statute). With in-
fectious invalidity, the validity of the present estates for life or years can-
not be determined while they are in existence. A recent Connecticut case8 3
involved a will which gave life income interests in part of the residue to
78. This was based on Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20,
§ 163.
79. See notes 68-70 supra.
80. See note 13 supra.
81. See notes 12 & 17 supra.
82. 1978 Pennsylvania legislation making the 1947 Pennsylvania "wait and
see" statute (20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6104) retroactive was held constitutional in In re
Frank, 480 Pa. 116, ,389 A.2d 536 (1978).
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the testator's children and grandchildren, with remainder to his great-
grandchildren. The validity of these dispositions was not litigated until the
first grandchild died. The court struck down not only the remainder .to
the great-grandchildren but also the life interests of the grandchildren,
which could not vest too remotely. As the grandchildren had been receiving
income for some years, it would seem that they or the trustee would have
to pay over the amount already received by them to the successors in in-
terest of the children, who might well be legatees under their stepparents'
wills to whom they and the testator were not related. What good is a life
income interest if the life beneficiary dare not spend the money because
it cannot be ascertained until his death whether it is valid?
In applying the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell,84 the English courts re-
formed the remainder to the unborn child of the unborn life tenant cy-pres
by giving the life tenant an estate tail.85 Reformation cy-pres was used
by the New Hampshire court in 1891 to cut the age contingency in a class
gift to grandchildren from forty to twenty-one and thus save it under the
Rule Against Perpetuities.8 6 Such judicial reformation cy-pres was advo-
cated in a 1946 article by James Quarles8T and a masterly 1963 article by
Olin Browder8s that served as a brief in support of the Missouri Bar bill.
This bill failed in the 1963 session of the General Assembly8 9 but passed
in 1965.90 As Professor Browder pointed out, immediate reformation cy-pres
can do anything that "wait and see" could do without forcing life tenants
to wait until their deaths to find out whether their life interests are valid.
Secondly, it deprives heirs of the motive to attack wills on perpetuities
grounds. Browder suggested as a third advantage the possibility of tailor-
ing the disposition to the existing family situation. For example, instead
of changing a class gift to grandchildren who reach forty to one to those
who reach twenty-one, a court could, in a case where the likelihood of
more grandchildren is highly unlikely, limit the gift to grandchildren in
being at the testator's death.
Last but not least, judicial reformation cy-pres can free us from the
84. 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890); notes 2 8: 3 supra.
85. Nicholl v. Nicholl, 96 Eng. Rep. 683 (1777); Humberston v. Humberston,
24 Eng. Rep. 412 (1716).
86. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 300 (1891).
87. Quarles, The Gy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the
Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv.
384 (1946).
88. Browder, Construction, Reformation and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
62 MicH. L. RFv. 1 (1963).
89. S. 263, 72d GA (1963).
90. S. 318, 73d GA (1965); RSMo § 442.555 (1978). Governor Hearnes ap-
proved the bill after conferring with Professor Eckhardt and this writer. Eckhardt,
Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 31 Mo. L. REv. 56 (1966), discusses the extent
to which the act is retroactive.
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horrible principle of antediluvian caninity.9 1 A trust to support my old
dog Fido as long as he lives can be reformed cy-pres so as not to last longer
than twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of the descendants
of Queen Victoria in being when Fido's master died. This would ensure
comfortable support for Fido during the first hundred of his remaining
230 years.
91. Judicial reformation cy-pres of an interest which violates the Rule Against
Perpetuities is now permitted at the beginning of the perpetuity period in Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. It is per-
mitted at the end of the "wait and see" period in Kentucky, New Hampshire,
New Zealand, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of PROP-
ER-ry (Tent. Draft No. 2, § 1.5, 1979) would permit such reformation at the end
of the "wait and see" period. L. SimEs &c A. SmiaTrH, supra note 6, §§ 1256, 1411
(1979 Supp.). "Wait and see" legislation of the Massachusetts type does not help
poor Fido. The waiting is limited to the period of human lives involved in the
disposition and Fido is not a human being. Eaton v. Miller, 250 A.2d 220 (Me.
1969). Under the Pennsylvania type of legislation the waiting may be for 21 years.
Presumably Fido should be told, "If you die within 21 years you get the money but
if you live for more than 21 years you get nothing." Under either type of "wait
and see," Fido starves to death.
[Vol. 45
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